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Abstract
Uniform-price electricity markets as operated in
Germany, for instance, rely on a redispatch mechanism
after market clearing to ensure the technical feasibility
of generation and consumption schedules with regard
to grid constraints. This mechanism determines the
costs of congestion management and the welfare loss
due to the limited transmission capacity. Therefore, the
mechanism is suited to incentivize welfare increasing
grid expansion. Depending on the distribution
of congestion management costs, it can also align
stakeholder interests. In this paper, we present an
auction mechanism for transmission grid expansion
based on the reduction of redispatch expenditures that
theoretically leads to a welfare optimal expansion. The
mechanism is applied to a case study in Germany. The
results show that the developed mechanism supports an
improved planning of grid capacity expansion.
1. Introduction
Transmission grid congestion management is an
often considered topic in energy economics. Steven
Stoft calls it ”one of the toughest problems in electricity
market design” ([1], p. 24. While it is generally
desirable to place generation capacity as close to the
load as possible if ambient conditions are equal at all
locations, it might be beneficial from a welfare point
of view to place generation capacity where it works
most efficiently in case of different ambient conditions.
In practice this means that wind turbines are installed
in windy areas and PV panels in sunny areas. In
this case, a transmission grid needs to be constructed
that allows to transmit energy from generation to
load centers. In such an environment congestion
might occur if the energy that needs to be transmitted
surpasses the capacity constraints of the network. This
congestion needs to be managed to ensure a balanced
grid operation. The chosen mechanism for short-term
congestion management depends on the market design
[2]. Markets that employ locational marginal pricing
(i.e., nodal pricing) handle congestion at market
clearing by considering network constraints explicitly.
Uniform-price markets need a specific mechanism to
manage congestion as the market is cleared centrally
without consideration of the network. This mechanism
is called redispatch as it is a deviation from the
original economic dispatch [3]. The compensation of
generators for the redispatch can be regulated and is
then usually cost-based or it can be organized through
a market process in which case it is market-based [4].
Zonal pricing is a compromise between nodal and
uniform-pricing. Cross-zonal capacity is explicitly
considered during the market clearing, while intra-zonal
congestion is managed through redispatch.
Systematic long-term congestion occurs if the
generation and consumption patterns are not aligned
with the transmission network topology. There are
multiple ways to reduce this congestion. For instance,
generation capacity with low marginal cost can be
constructed close to consumption centers. Another
option is transmission grid capacity expansion.
Transmission grids are complex networks. It is difficult
to determine the optimal expansion because this
includes the correct anticipation of future generation
and consumption patterns as well as the reaction of
stakeholders to grid expansion. The problem has a
spatial and a temporal component. Spatial, because
the exact location of load and generation determine the
flows in the network and temporal because the load and
the generation from renewable sources vary with time.
It is therefore reasonable to allow for some congestion
in peak periods [5]. Additionally, grid expansions
are time intensive and often unpopular with the local
population [6].
Previous attempts of liberalizing the market for
transmission grid expansions are focused on markets
with locational marginal pricing. The developed
mechanisms are based on financial transmission rights
that entitle their owners to transmission congestion
rents in case of congestion and differing locational
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prices. However, these designs come with a variety
of challenges often rooted in the design of nodal
pricing markets. In this paper, we present an approach
to incentivize a welfare optimal grid expansion in
uniform-price electricity markets through cost-based
redispatch. While this congestion management design
generally entails the risk of strategic behavior such as
inc-dec gaming [7], this is not an issue for the proposed
mechanism. The auction design is based on the fact
that congestion management costs caused by redispatch
exactly reflect the possible welfare gain of a grid
expansion. It is a first approach to long-term congestion
management in Europe. In this contribution we focus
on the German market and its congestion management
design. This is an important contribution as no other
locational signals exist in European uniform-price
electricity markets to reduce long-term structural
congestion. In this paper we answer the following
research questions: (i) What is the economic effect
of cost-based redispatch? (ii) How can cost-based
redispatch incentivize grid expansion? (iii) What is the
effect of a corresponding auction mechanism on the
system design?
2. Related work
There are two major approaches for incentivizing
transmission grid expansion: Long-term financial
transmission rights and a regulatory approach [8]. In
the following both designs are briefly introduced and
related research is presented. Finally, the incentives of
market participants in regard to grid expansion and the
redispatch mechanism are discussed.
Merchant transmission Merchant transmission
approaches are considered by various authors such
as [9, 10]. These approaches have the benefit of
incentivizing grid expansion based on economic
criteria. These are assessed by private parties who then
bear the risk for unnecessary expansion. Merchant
transmission approaches are based on the allocation of
financial transmission rights (FTRs) to the investors of
the corresponding transmission line [11]. The owners
of these rights receive the transmission congestion
rent if congestion occurs in the grid [12]. The authors
of [13] perform one of the first studies on incentive
design for electricity grid expansion. They expand
on their ideas in [14]. They argue that assigning
FTRs can correctly incentivize optimal grid expansion
under a few assumptions. However, in [9], the authors
argue that these assumptions are quite restrictive.
Other authors argue that the payments for FTRs do
not sufficiently compensate for the investment in
transmission capacity [15, 16, 17]. Other authors argue
that congestion revenue in the form of transmission
congestion rent is poorly designed to incentivize
optimal grid expansion because it does not reflect the
potential welfare gain of grid expansion [18]. We follow
this line of argumentation in this paper and show in
Section 3 how redispatch correctly incentivizes grid
expansion in regard to welfare increase. Finally, in [8]
the authors combine the merchant approach with the
regulatory approach to overcome the problem of lacking
compensation for grid expansion through transmission
rents. This concept is further tested in [19].
Regulated transmission expansion Germany and
most European countries regulate the transmission grid
and incentivize the expansion through a revenue-cap
incentive regulation [20]. A detailed discussion
on the German regulation mechanism is provided
in [21]. The author points out that the current
regulation incentivizes capital intensive solutions over
other short-term measures that increase the operating
costs. This is due to the fact that the transmission
system operators (TSOs) receive guaranteed interest on
their equity. Alternative approaches such as battery
storage are therefore not considered as proposed by [22].
Other authors point out that TSOs have incentives to
inefficiently inflate the need for grid expansion [23].
Furthermore, the regulation leads to problems when it
comes to cross-border transmission expansion projects
and the corresponding compensation. In [24], the
authors propose a procedure to allocate gains from such
projects to the involved parties.
Incentives for transmission grid expansion Besides
the financial incentives for grid expansion, it is also
important to consider the interests of different market
actors. Even if a certain transmission expansion
increases the social welfare, it might have adverse
effects for some parties. This is especially true
for markets with nodal prices, as transmission grid
expansion might increase the prices at certain nodes. In
[25], the authors consider incentives of different market
parties for a certain transmission expansion. They
find that the ability to exercise market power can lead
to inverted incentives. Furthermore, in nodal pricing
markets, grid expansions have an impact on generation
investment decisions as they lead to a differing set of
prices. This phenomenon is considered in [26]. The
authors formulate a multi-stage optimization problem
to analyze the strategic responses to transmission
expansion. They find several conflicts of interest among
market parties. The author of [27] performs an analysis
of the welfare effects of transmission grid expansion.
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Among other results, the author points out that a strict
unbundling of generation and transmission grid assets is
necessary. We further elaborate on this observation later
in the paper.
Redispatch Redispatch is the process of adjusting
the schedule of producers such that the market result
of a uniform-price electricity market becomes feasible
with regard to the network constraints [3]. In its ideal
form, the theoretical nodal pricing market result is
achieved [28]. In Germany, the cost for congestion
management through the redispatch mechanism have
been increasing in the last few years and reached a
record high of 1.4 billion in 2017 after not surpassing
100 million until 2011 [29]. They are expected to
reach 4 billion by 2023 [30]. This is caused by the
development of renewable generation and the nuclear
phase-out [31]. The redispatch mechanism in Germany
is cost-based: A power plant is compensated with an
amount that is calculated based on a fixed procedure
[32] that should represent the operating and market
opportunity costs of the power plant. However, the
European Commission recently instructed all member
states to employ a market-based redispatch mechanism
[33]. This is highly debated [34] as such a design
might allow for similar strategic behavior as the inc-dec
gaming in the Californian market [7].
3. Cost-based redispatch
The cost-based redispatch mechanism pays a
compensation to power plants that are asked to increase
their generation based on their production costs. Power
plants in a generation pocket that need to decrease their
generation on the other hand, are required to reimburse
the TSOs with their marginal cost of generation. Note
that they are not required to pay back the uniform
market clearing price they received. The difference
is socialized and being paid through grid tariffs by
the consumers. This means that the producer surplus
that is lost due to grid constraints is being covered
by consumers. The cost of increasing generation in
load pockets is also covered by consumers [3]. The
economic consequences are depicted in Fig. 1. The
increasing line represents the marginal generation costs
at a certain node. The decreasing line represents the
saved marginal generation costs through supply from
the transmission grid. If there is no congestion, the
market clearing price is represented by the intersection
of the two curves. The dashed line shows the level of
the market clearing price. Congestion is represented
by the vertical line. The quantity to the left of the
line on the x-axis is the supply from the grid. The
quantity between the vertical line and the equilibrium
point represents the necessary redispatch. The resulting
triangle is the potential welfare gain of a grid expansion.
In theory, the potential additional consumer surplus is
the area in the triangle above the dashed line and the
additional producer surplus the area below the dashed
line. However, as stated, the entire costs are borne
by the consumers and a grid expansion therefore only
affects the consumer surplus. It is important to note that
the redispatch cost exactly represents the welfare gain
of a non-congested transmission system compared to
the status quo. The checkered area below the marginal
production cost curve is the amount that generators
need to reimburse to the TSOs as this represents the
saved operating costs. The entire grey area is the cost
for the increased redispatch generation.
The mechanism can be formulated as a two stage
optimization problem. First, the market is cleared
uniformly. This means that the production cost is
minimized without consideration of the transmission
grid constraints. For simplicity we ignore ramping
constraints and idle times, which are common
assumptions [23, 35]. The optimization problem is given
in Equ. 1. It considers generation constraints and the
balance constraint between generation and demand over
all buses and generators.
min
T∑
t=1
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pi,j · qi,j,t (1a)
s.t.
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
qi,j,t =
Nb∑
i=1
di,t,∀t ∈ T (1b)
qi,j,t ≤ ci,j,t,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T (1c)
q(i,j,t) ≥ 0, ,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T (1d)
pi,j Marginal cost of unit j at node i
qi,j,t Generation at node i of unit j at time t
ci,j,t Capacity of production unit j at node i
(at time t for renewables)
di,t Demand at node i at time t
Nb Number of buses (nodes)
In the second stage after the market clearing, the
market result is adjusted to ensure a physically feasible
solution. Therefore, the transmission constraints are
included as shown in Equ. 2 and redispatch is
performed. The formulation is based on a direct
current approximation and ignores losses [36]. In the
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Figure 1. Economics of cost-based redispatch
objective function the marginal cost of production that
is reimbursed to the TSOs is subtracted from the cost
of increasing generation. The sum of redispatch needs
to equal zero and the capacity constraints need to be
respected after the redispatch. We use this formulation
in the following section to describe the expansion policy.
min
T∑
t=1
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pi,j · q∆i,j,t
s.t.
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
q∆i,j,t = 0,∀t ∈ T
qi,j,t + q
∆
i,j,t ≤ ci,j,t,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
q(i,j,t) + q
∆
i,j,t ≥ 0,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
|
Nb−1∑
i=1
H(l,i) · (
J∑
j=1
(qi,j,t + q
∆
i,j,t)− di,t))|
≤ τl,∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ Nl
(2)
q∆i,j,t Redispatch at node i of unit j at time t
H Matrix of power distribution factors
τl Transmission capacity of line l
Nl Number of lines
4. Transmission grid expansion
mechanism
The economic characteristics of the cost-based
redispatch make it a well designed indicator for the
economic value of grid expansions. While it has
other weaknesses, it reflects the possible welfare gain
of additional grid capacity. Based on this design we
propose a mechanism that incentivizes a welfare optimal
grid expansion. The proposed mechanism operates in
three stages: The discovery stage, the auction stage and
the compensation stage. All stages are described in the
following.
Discovery First, a new transmission expansion project
needs to be identified. This is not necessarily the
role of the regulator. In the proposed mechanism, any
investor has an incentive of proposing a transmission
expansion project that she considers beneficial from a
social welfare perspective. This project is proposed
to the regulator. Several projects might be proposed
to the regulator at the same time. It is important to
establish a decision rule for the regulator to prioritize
projects because they might affect each other and one
project might not be profitable anymore if another one is
realized first. An approach to prioritize grid expansion
projects is proposed in [37]. Once the regulator has
chosen the next project, it is made public. Any interested
party can evaluate the project and later participate in
the auction stage. At this point, it is important that
the regulator defines the generation portfolio that is later
considered in the compensation stage.
Auction Once the project is evaluated and the
assumed generation portfolio is established, investors
can bid on the project. Their bid consists of the time
period, during which they want to receive the reduction
in redispatch costs (and thus the welfare gain) that is
achieved through the proposed transmission expansion
project. The mechanism is implemented as a Vickrey
auction to ensure incentive compatibility. This auction is
similar to tendering auctions such as mobile frequencies
and can learn from the experiences in these processes
[38]. The investor who bids the shortest compensation
period wins the auction and receives the compensation
for the time period bid by the runner up investor.
Compensation Finally, once the project is developed,
the investors are compensated. In each market clearing
period, the need for redispatch is calculated following
a transparent and previously introduced process. This
is done using the former grid topology and the grid
topology including the expanded lines. The difference
in redispatch costs is paid to the investors. As grid
expansion may have a negative effect on the overall grid
capacity, this amount can be negative, in which case the
investors pay to the TSOs. The redispatch costs are
calculated using the assumed generation portfolio that
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the regulator announced in the Discovery and any new
generation capacity addition. The importance of this
step is further discussed in Section 6. The payments
to investors are socialized to the consumers who would
have had to pay redispatch costs in the same amount if
the grid expansion project had not been realized.
4.1. Mechanism characteristics
The cost-based redispatch mechanism itself has
certain flaws. For example, it causes additional cost and
it only discovers the welfare optimal economic dispatch
if TSOs optimize their grids correctly. Additionally, it
offers the possibility of gaming the market through a
variation of the inc-dec gaming [32]. However, with
regards to incentivizing grid expansion it has favorable
properties which are discussed in the following.
1. Consumers do not pay more than without the
mechanism.
Without the mechanism it would be necessary to use
redispatch to ensure a balanced transmission system.
These costs would be covered by the consumers.
Therefore, payments for an addition to the network do
not create additional costs for consumers. However,
once the compensation period is over, the consumers
benefit from reduced congestion management costs.
Therefore, the approach can be characterized as a form
of a split the savings strategy that has already been
formulated in [39] for electricity pool markets.
2. Incentives of stakeholders are aligned.
As the congestion management costs are socialized,
the consumers are equally interested in a welfare
increasing expansion of the transmission system.
Therefore, it is easier to allocate costs, as rules like
the beneficiary pays that is formulated in FERC order
No. 1000 are not necessary. This does of course not
address the ”not-in-my-backyard phenomenon” [6] but
from a financial viewpoint all consumers are on the same
side. The expansion has no impact on the wholesale
electricity price for consumers. Furthermore, as the
wholesale market is not impacted by transmission grid
expansions, the generators should be agnostic to grid
expansion.
3. The compensation covers the investment.
As the transmission expansions are compensated
by the welfare gain they create, the compensation
covers the investment. If this is not the case, then
the investment is inefficient to begin with. It is of
course possible that an investor wrongly anticipates
future generation and load patterns. However, in an ideal
world with perfect foresight, the mechanism leads to a a
welfare optimal grid expansion.
4. The risk of inefficient expansion is borne by
investors.
This advantage is related to the previous discussion.
It is still possible that the grid is expanded inefficiently
if an investor makes mistakes in her forecasts of future
generation and consumption patterns. While under the
regulatory approach this risk is borne by the consumers
who compensate TSOs for any grid expansion regardless
of its efficiency, it is now transferred to private investors
who act on the (un)certainty of their own forecasts.
5. The market finds the welfare optimal solution by
itself.
Finally, the mechanism does not require regulatory
oversight of the grid expansion and development. The
market actors have incentives of proposing welfare
efficient projects. There are no mixed incentives as a
degradation of the grid causes payback to the TSOs.
The approach therefore allows for a liberalization of the
transmission grid expansion market.
4.2. Investment optimization
An investor needs to consider the future generation
and consumption patterns in order to determine an
optimal grid expansion with regard to the possible
payback. She therefore needs to solve the uniform
market clearing problem followed by optimizing the
grid expansion considering expansion and redispatch
costs. It is important to note that transmission lines often
need to be expanded in joint projects rather than line
by line. An individual expansion of a line might only
move congestion from one line to the next which does
not necessarily decrease congestion costs but might even
increase them if more expensive power plants are needed
to cure the new congestion. The optimization problem
is given in Equ. 3. It is an extension of the redispatch
mechanism given in Equ. 2. In its given formulation,
line capacity can both be expanded or newly developed.
Page 3111
min
T∑
t=1
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pi,j · q∆i,j,t +
L∑
l=1
τexpl · pexpl
s.t.
Nb∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
q∆i,j,t = 0,∀t ∈ T
qi,j,t + q
∆
i,j,t ≤ ci,j,t,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
q(i,j,t) + q
∆
i,j,t ≥ 0,∀i ∈ Nb,∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T
|
Nb−1∑
i=1
H(l,i) · (
J∑
j=1
(qi,j,t + q
∆
i,j,t)− di,t))|
≤ (τl + τexpl ),∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ Nl
(3)
τexpl Expansion of line l
pexpl Cost of expansion of line l per MW and period
5. Analytical example and case study
Consider the system given in Fig. 2. The cheaper
production is located at node A with marginal cost of
production mci and the generation qi. The load li is
higher at note B with i ∈ {A,B}. Using nodal pricing,
the price at node A pA is 9 $/MWh and pB is 12
$/MWh. This results in total payments of the consumers
of 165 $, a producer surplus of 76.5 $ and a congestion
rent of 12 $. Note that an expansion of the line to a
capacity tAB to 5 MW would not be in the interest of
the holder of financial transmission rights for that line
because it would eliminate the congestion and therefore
the congestion rent. Now, we consider a uniform-price
market with cost-based redispatch. The market clears
without consideration of the transmission constraint.
Therefore, the market clears at pA = pB = 10 $/MWh,
qA = 10 MWh and qB = 5 MWh. This schedule is not
feasible as the necessary transmission from node A to
B is 5 MW, which exceeds the line capacity. Therefore,
the generation at node A is reduced by 1 MW and the
generation at node B is increased by 1 MW. At node
A the generator reimburses the system operator for the
avoided cost of production of 9.5 $. The generator at
node B receives 11 $ for the increase in generation.
Therefore, the cost for redispatch is 1.5 $. Now, we
assume an investor that is willing to expand the line and
that the parameters of the system never change. The
costs of expanding the line capacity by 1 MW is cAB
per considered period. In practice that period can be an
hour or 15 minutes, depending on how often the market
Figure 2. Two-node transmission system
is cleared and redispatch is performed. However, given
the assumptions of power and energy in this example it
is by hour. Therefore, if cAB > 1.5 $ it is not reasonable
to expand the line. In that case the cost of line expansion
would exceed its benefit and the investor would not
consider it. Note, that the interest of the investor and the
system welfare considerations are aligned: If congestion
is avoided in the system, the consumers pay a total of
150 $, the producer surplus is reduced by 1.5 $ and the
transmission rent of 12 $ is avoided. Therefore, the
total welfare increase of an uncongested system is 1.5
$. This way, the correct market signals are sent to the
investor and welfare optimal transmission expansion is
performed.
5.1. Simulative evaluation
In order to assess the effects of the mechanism, it
is evaluated using an abstracted version of the German
electricity transmission grid. To do so, Germany is
divided into a zonal model with 5 bidding zones. The
setup is given in Fig. 3. It loosely corresponds to the
regions of the four German TSOs. Only the central
TSO TenneT is divided into two zones to account
for the North-South division of the German electricity
system: Lignite and wind generation is mostly located
in the North and North-East while most consumption
occurs in the South. The transmission capacity is
based on the static grid models of the TSOs TenneT
[40], Amprion [41], TransnetBW [42] and 50Hertz
[43]. In the following simulation each zone corresponds
to one node. This way we can optimize the load
flow as if we had a full network model. We use
empirical data for renewable generation and load from
[44]. The conventional generation capacity is based
on the capacity reported by the German regulator [45].
The technology specific marginal costs of generation
are based on [46]. We assume a static optimization.
That means that the investor does not foresee the
development of generation and demand patterns but
always optimizes the generation expansion based on
the current patterns. This is done here to illustrate
the effects of the mechanism. We only consider line
reinforcement and no construction of additional lines
Page 3112
Figure 3. Zonal model of German transmission grid
as this easily becomes a very complex problem [2]. A
similar approach is used in [47]. The authors only allow
for one additional line along the North-South division
in Germany. Such a line is already included in our
model and therefore does not need to be considered
explicitly. We assume all lines to be of equal length
and only distinguish between different line capacities.
Similarly, [23] only consider line length between zone
centers in a zonal representation of the German system.
We base the cost per MW of capacity on the HVDC
project SuedOstLink. This model calculation serves as
an illustration of the mechanism. In future research
we will include more detailed transmission network
data for the German system including a forecast of
the development of spatial and temporal generation and
consumption patterns.
Static results The simulation results for the year 2016
are given in Table 1. The numbers show that the
expansion using the redispatch incentive mechanism
leads to the same welfare optimal expansion as under
a nodal pricing market design. Through this expansion,
the redispatch costs are reduced from 95 million to 39
million Euro per year. It is considerable that 41% of the
total redispatch in the base scenario should be managed
in the short-term through congestion management rather
than through grid expansion. It underlines the paradigm
that the grid should not be expanded to transmit the
last kWh [5]. However, this is incentivized through the
German incentive regulation [48]. Expanding the grid
such that no congestion occurs anymore increases the
overall yearly costs by 700 million Euro and is by far
the most expensive option. Even if reducing congestion
is a priority objective over economic considerations,
the reduction of redispatch to 10% of its original value
Scenario Consumercosts
Producer
surplus
Cong. rent/
redispatch
Grid exp.
(in MW)
Nodal pricing 9,453 4,305 164 592
Redispatch optimal 9,311 4,289 39 592
Redispatch 90% 9,331 4,289 9 1,401
No congestion 10,035 4,289 0 12,806
No expansion 9,329 4,289 95 0
Table 1. Welfare evaluation of different scenarios in
million Euro
Figure 4. Congestion management costs over the
course of 2016
is only 21 million Euro more expensive per year than
the optimal solution. Note that both options are not
economically reasonable and would not be undertaken
by an investor under the proposed auction mechanism.
Furthermore, the results show that generators should be
agnostic to line expansions as their producer surplus
does not change in a market with uniform-price design.
In Fig. 4 the need for redispatch in the course of
2016 is displayed in a 15-minute resolution. It shows
that the need for redispatch is especially high during
the winter month which corresponds to the actual
redispatch quantities in Germany. It can also be seen
that high spikes of redispatch persist even with the
grid expansion. This is caused by the intermittency of
renewable generation that makes it even more important
to consider short-term congestion management as a
viable alternative to long-term grid expansion.
Sequential evaluation In order to assess the effects
of an evaluation over multiple years, the mechanism is
applied to the years 2016 to 2018. Additionally, the year
2018 is considered a second time as another data point
with a finalized nuclear phase-out that will be completed
in Germany in 2022. As most of the still operational
nuclear power units are situated in the South, this
further increases the imbalance between the North and
the South [49]. Each year is again statically considered
and the payments for an expansion based on that year
are calculated in the next meaning that an instantaneous
project realization is assumed. The approach allows
a perspective on the load and generation uncertainty
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Year Red.costs
Red. costs
w/o exp.
Opt. exp.
(MW)
Payment
investors
2016 95 95 592 0
2017 136 187 909 52
2018 126 271 858 145
2018 (w/o Nuc.) 76 317 429 241
Table 2. Grid development and associated costs in
million Euro over four year period
over several years: The expansion is always realized
ex-post based on the trend in the respective year and
the compensation is then evaluated on the following
year. Therefore, the uncertain infeed of intermittent
renewable capacity and load can have an impact on the
investor’s revenue. It can be seen that even though this
is a naı¨ve strategy, it yields positive profits. This shows
that the agglomeration of cheap generation capacity in
the North is continuing. The shown expanded capacity
is always a reinforcement of the line between TenneT
North zone 4 and TenneT South zone 2. No other
lines need expansion. In every year, the reinforcement
of that line is increased. It can be seen from the last
column that the theoretical redispatch in the last year
is reduced by roughly 75% through the mechanism
which is equivalent to 241 million Euro. This amount is
reimbursed to the investor.
Overall, we find that the mechanism incentivizes a
grid expansion that is welfare optimal and that takes
into account that certain congestion management should
occur through other measures than grid expansion.
This leaves avenues for further research which are
discussed in the following section along with practical
considerations for the mechanism.
6. Discussion
The proposed mechanism has a few drawbacks that
need to be considered.
Redispatch procedure First, the redispatch procedure
needs to be clearly defined and all associated
calculations need to be agreed upon before the auction
begins. This includes the calculation of the virtual
marginal cost of production of redispatched units and
the exact optimization problem formulation of the
redispatch selection procedure. The calculation of
marginal costs of production needs to include a possible
extension to newly constructed units. It needs to be
considered how temporary unavailability is treated as
well. These aspects are essential and need to be carefully
designed as they form the basis for the optimal grid
expansion.
Forecasts and risk Transmission lines are written off
over 40 years [23]. Even if this would no longer
be the case under the proposed auction mechanism as
investors only need to consider their bid time horizon,
the amortization period might still be long. Investment
decisions for such a time horizon need to be carefully
considered and involve a lot of uncertainty. It is unclear
how this uncertainty impacts the decisions for grid
expansion. If it is prohibitively high, then necessary
grid expansions are not considered or only few investors
participate in the bidding. This would decrease the
efficiency of the mechanism. However, it is debatable
whether the public should finance such projects if
private investors consider the related risk as too high.
Furthermore, if forecasts are far off, the mechanism
would result in an inefficient grid expansion that would
increase public opposition against any transmission grid
expansion projects and damage the efficiency of the
approach in the long run.
Competition One central element of efficient markets
and auctions is competition [38]. Therefore, it is
important to attract sufficient competitors for each
project. The actors and investors for such expansion
projects are currently unknown as such projects have
not yet been tendered. It is however not difficult to test
the design for a few smaller projects before deploying
it for all grid expansions. This would help to judge the
landscape of potential participants.
Unbundling For the mechanism to work it is
important to ensure a strict unbundling between
generation and transmission. This should be the case
in most countries but needs to be strictly overseen [50].
A generation company could otherwise give notice to a
certain investor of a planned expansion of regional cheap
electricity generation capacity that could potentially
change the nature of congestion. An investor could
now act on this knowledge and propose an according
grid expansion that would not be profitable without the
generation expansion. The investor would therefore
have an unfair competitive advantage. Furthermore,
generation companies could bid into the market in a way
to increase the virtual redispatch on a newly constructed
line to increase the revenue of the investor. Such
strategic considerations are to be avoided through a
rigorous regulation on collusive behavior.
Decommissioning power plants Finally, one
important aspect is the change in virtual redispatch
costs if certain power plants are decommissioned. The
virtual redispatch that would occur without newly
constructed lines. Usually, the regulator in Germany
Page 3114
would prevent generators from decommissioning if
the power plant is important for the system stability.
However, due to new transmission capacity, a power
plant could no longer be needed. If such a power
plant is shut down, it is possible that virtual redispatch
could no longer be performed because no other regional
generation capacity exists or the costs could become
prohibitively high. Therefore, the regulator needs to
establish a base case of available generation capacity
when a project is auctioned off. This generation
capacity is then later assumed to be available even
if specific plants are decommissioned. However,
new generation technology is to be included in the
calculation of redispatch.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we propose an auction mechanism
that incentivizes transmission grid expansion based on
cost-based redispatch that is used in many European
countries with a uniform-price electricity market to
achieve feasible results with regard to grid constraints.
We provide an economic description of the cost-based
redispatch mechanism and show that the redispatch
costs correspond to the welfare gain of a line expansion.
Furthermore, we describe how this mechanism aligns
financial interests of stakeholders in the electricity
sector. We then provide an analytical illustrative
example and then apply the mechanism to an abstracted
zonal version of the German transmission grid. The
evaluation shows that the mechanism leads to the
same welfare optimal grid expansion as nodal pricing.
This is due to the fact that the two optimization
problems aim to find the same solution. Furthermore,
it is shown that the optimal solution is considerably
cheaper than an expansion to transmit the last generated
kWh. Additionally, the results show that generators
are theoretically agnostic to a grid expansion. The
mechanism is then applied over a four year period to
illustrate its dynamics. We find that the development
of generation and consumption patterns in Germany
point in the same direction over the years such that a
static optimization on individual years would currently
be profitable for an investor. Finally, possible limitations
of the proposed auction mechanism are discussed
and addressed. With that we answer the considered
research questions: (i) Cost-based redispatch exactly
represents the possible welfare gain of expanding the
transmission system to a state without congestion. (ii)
Using this characteristic, transmission expansion can
be incentivized through redispatch costs because a
transmission line is beneficial if and only if it reduces
redispatch costs beyond the investment costs for its
construction. (iii) Therefore, an auction mechanism that
pays compensation based on reduced redispatch costs
leads to a welfare optimal grid expansion.
The objective of this paper is the introduction and
illustration of the auction mechanism for the expansion
of transmission capacity. The application to the zonal
version of the German transmission grid limits the
generalizability of the results to the entire transmission
system. Furthermore, rather than considering static
choices, a projection of the expansion of regional
generation capacity should be considered. Finally,
the mechanism should be experimentally evaluated to
be able to judge the behavior of participants. These
extensions will be addressed in future research.
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